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In the philosophical works of Emmanuel Levinas sʼ 
early career, it is in a phenomenology of Eros that 
he claims to have uncovered the site of what he calls 
ʻtranscendence .ʼ This is no small claim. According to 
the argument of the later Totality and Infinity (1961),1 
the history of Western philosophy is to be thought as 
the history of the ʻphilosophy of the same .ʼ Within 
this polemical generalization almost the whole of 
Western philosophy is characterized as a totalizing 
discourse which aims to reduce everything to the 
categories of a thematizing consciousness. Conceptual 
structures are employed (or presupposed) in order to 
make diverse phenomena commensurable within a 
system, and according to Levinas this operation always 
constitutes a reduction of what is ʻotherʼ to the order 
of the ʻsame .ʼ In agreement with a certain transcenden-
talism which is itself implicated in Levinas sʼ critique, 
these structures of thought are then equated with 
consciousness itself; the thematizing project is one of 
mastery in which noemata will of necessity conform 
to noesis, in which the object is constituted for and by 
the subject. The experience of transcendence, so rare 
in this version of philosophy sʼ history, is the experi-
ence of whatever is and truly remains other than me,2 
recalcitrant to mastery through conceptualization and 
to the transcendental project of the subject to construe 
everything as originating from within itself.
If, then, it is first of all in the erotic relation that 
the possibility of the experience of transcendence is 
said to arise, Eros can in no sense be dismissed as 
an unimportant or peripheral theme for Levinas, and 
a full investigation is warranted, especially given the 
current interest in Levinas sʼ work, interest which is not 
limited to the discipline of philosophy. Furthermore, as 
the notion of Eros is closely associated, textually and 
conceptually, with what Levinas calls ʻthe feminine ,ʼ 
critical attention has been excited amongst feminist 
scholars of various persuasions, with claims – both 
positive and negative – being made for Levinas sʼ 
significance as a resource for feminist philosophy 
and feminist politics. If assertions of a ʻLevinasianʼ 
feminism, no matter how qualified, tend to rest on 
the idea that Levinas sʼ phenomenology of Eros, and 
analyses of ʻthe feminineʼ mark a break in or a new 
departure from a ʻmasculinistʼ tradition, this article 
seeks, in part, to argue to the contrary.
Eating/loving
It is in Existence and Existents (1947)3 that Eros first 
surfaces as a philosophical theme, described there 
by Levinas as the primordial relation with the Other 
(Autrui). It is the fact of this relation, the presence of 
the Other in this relation, that opens up the possibility 
of transcendence, because it is, primordially and para-
digmatically, the experience of the other person, radi-
cally inaccessible to comprehension, that breaks the 
cycle of the return to self, the circle of the selfsame. 
In order to explain the specificity and the extraordinary 
potentiality of Eros, Levinas distinguishes between the 
two pleasures of eating and love (amour), where the 
latter is characterized by an essential and insatiable 
hunger. Unlike the desire to eat, amorous desire is 
not merely an agitation (trouble) that precedes the 
attempt at gratification, but is a desire augmented by 
such an attempt. Being mistaken about the nature of 
amorous desire, confusing it with a hunger able to be 
satisfied by the possession of an object, gives rise to 
what Levinas poignantly describes as ʻthe ridiculous 
and tragic simulation of devouring in kissing and 
biting .ʼ4 This misunderstanding also accounts for the 
tendency to see the impossibility of the full possession 
or incorporation of the beloved as a failure inherent in 
love. On the contrary, for Levinas the very positivity 
of love lies in its negativity:
Intersubjectivity … is brought about by Eros, where 
in the proximity of another the distance is wholly 
maintained, a distance whose pathos is made up of 
this proximity and this duality of beings. What is 
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presented as the failure of communication in love in 
fact constitutes the positive character of the relation-
ship; this absence of the other is precisely his pres-
ence qua other.5
It is important that in Existence and Existents 
the face-to-face relation, that which later is ethics, 
is explicitly thematized as Eros, that all relations of 
ʻcivilizationʼ are said to refer back to this relation of 
Eros in which the Other is first encountered.6 There 
is, however, another important structural dimension 
to Eros as thematized in Existence and Existents, 
and one which Levinas castigates his philosophical 
forebears for having overlooked. For Levinas, the 
experience of the otherness of the Other appears para-
digmatically in love as a sexed otherness: ʻthe plane 
of Eros allows us to see that the other par excellence 
is the feminine.ʼ 7 Levinas returns to these thoughts in 
a series of lectures given in 1946–7, published under 
the title of Time and the Other,8 where Eros and the 
feminine function as uniquely paradigmatic for the 
possibility of thinking transcendence, and therefore as 
the very essence of the critique of the philosophy of 
the same. Echoing the philosophical investigations of 
Existence and Existents, Levinas describes the birth 
of the subject qua subject as ʻhypostasis ,ʼ the event 
of taking up a position in anonymous Being. What 
is new, however, is the language used to describe the 
subject or the self which thus appears. Hypostasis, 
an evanescent and solitary moment of beginning, 
a rupture in the infinite fabric of existence, actu-
ally constitutes a mastery of Being: ʻThe existent 
is master of existing. It exerts on its existence the 
virile [viril] power of the subject. It has something 
in its power.ʼ 9 The key word is ʻviril .ʼ Capable of 
being translated into English as both ʻvirileʼ and 
ʻmasculine ,ʼ rooted in the Latin for ʻmanʼ (vir), the 
meaning of the French word retains its sexuate origin 
explicitly. When, therefore, Levinas constructs the 
subject as ʻa virility, a pride and a sovereignty ,ʼ10 
he constructs the solitary subject as in some sense 
ʻmasculine ,ʼ a tendency which persists throughout the 
whole of his career. Power (pouvoir), mastery, con-
quest, sovereignty, virility, activity and heroism are all 
attributes of the subject which also characterize the 
intellectual and practical processes proper to it and 
its economy of the same: knowledge, comprehension, 
possession, incorporation, seizure, and so on. The 
subject is the beginning and the end of all these 
operations, transforming everything that is other into 
itself by imposing its own thematizing categories and 
sucking the world back into itself as elements of its 
own perception or intellection. Physical incorporation 
provides the model for these processes, analogously 
described, therefore, as ʻalimentary .ʼ11 
Also familiar in Time and the Other is the counter-
point to the above, the assertion that any true trans-
cendence can only be accomplished in an event which 
interrupts this circular return to the self, and the 
assertion that such an event is uniquely the face-to-face 
relation with the Other. In Time and the Other the 
phenomenon of death is also discussed as that which 
is in one way the most refractory for any knowledge, 
that which puts an end to the virility and heroism that 
constitute the subject. And yet death can tell us nothing 
about the event of transcendence, as death is an event 
of annihilation in which the subject is crushed, wiped 
out (écrasé). In the face-to-face relation with the Other 
the subject is similarly out of power, but its integrity 
as self is nevertheless maintained, and in Time and the 
Other, as in Existence and Existents, the erotic relation 
is prototypical. Furthermore, as it is also through the 
relation with the Other that the subject sʼ relation with 
the future is made possible, this relation is the very 
accomplishment of time.12 It is, then, all the more 
remarkable that for Levinas the erotic relation is the 
ʻoriginal form 1ʼ3 of the relation with the Other, as this 
gives to Eros an exalted philosophical importance not 
attempted since the time of Plato, and no less auda-
cious. For Levinas, however, this does not mitigate 
the philosophical abyss between them. Elaborating 
on the earlier passages in Existence and Existents, 
he again suggests that the originality of Eros lies in 
the experience of the sexed alterity of the Other. The 
passages are worth quoting in full:
Does a situation exist where the alterity of the other 
appears in its purity? Does a situation exist where 
the other would not have alterity only as the reverse 
side of its identity, would not comply only with the 
Platonic law of participation where every term con-
tains a sameness and through this sameness contains 
the other? Is there not a situation where alterity 
would be borne by a being in a positive sense, as 
essence? What is the alterity that does not purely 
and simply enter into the opposition of two species 
of the same genus? I think the absolutely contrary, 
whose contrareity is in no way affected by the 
relationship that can be established between it and 
its correlative, the contrareity that permits its terms 
to remain absolutely other, is the feminine.
Sex is not some specific difference. It is situated 
beside the logical division into genera and species. 
This division certainly never manages to reunite an 
empirical content. But it is not in this sense that it 
does not permit one to account for the difference 
between the sexes. The difference between the sexes 
is a formal structure, but one that carves up reality 
in another sense and conditions the very possibil-
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ity of reality as multiple, against the unity of being 
proclaimed by Parmenides.14
Searching for the possibility of transcendence, of a 
relation with the Other in which the subject is neither 
returned to itself nor annihilated, the erotic relation 
is posited as primordial because the erotic relation 
is hetero-sexual. The Levinasian subject, coded as 
masculine (or male; the Anglo-American sex/gender 
distinction is blurred in French), finds himself in 
the erotic relation face to face with alterity itself, 
the feminine. Any thinking of absolute alterity – of 
ʻdifference ,ʼ one might be tempted to say – therefore 
owes its possibility to the recognition of an originary 
sexual difference.
According to another history of Western philosophy, 
this may be interpreted as a very radical move indeed; 
it is, most famously, Luce Irigaray who has pointed this 
out.15 Very briefly, it is argued that it is precisely the 
alterity, or alternatively the specificity, of the feminine 
that has suffered most from a reduction to the economy 
of the same. The grammatical subsumption of the 
feminine gender into the allegedly universal generic 
masculine would be only one very obvious example in 
a tradition full of very obvious examples. The apparent 
opposition of two equal terms – the masculine and 
the feminine – is revealed instead as the domination 
of a standard over one of its inferior (Plato, Aristotle, 
Aquinas), castrated (Freud) specifications. As the not-
masculine, the copy of the original masculine, the 
pathologized masculine, the feminine, it is claimed, 
is not thought qua feminine at all. In this context, 
Levinas sʼ attempt to think the feminine, revealed in 
Eros, as alterity itself seems to be a wholly new and 
welcome departure.
The ambiguity of love
Levinas sʼ phenomenology of Eros is, however, most 
fully elaborated in Totality and Infinity (1961), and this 
text begins to tell a different story. In accordance with 
his method of declarative renaming (speculative asser-
tion or provocation as the beginning of philosophical 
discussion), the face-to-face relation – ʻethicsʼ – is 
now referred to as ʻmetaphysical desire ,ʼ ʻdiscourseʼ 
(ʻlanguageʼ), or ʻreligion ,ʼ and the way is opened for 
a more complex and ambivalent account of love which 
becomes progressively less positive. For Levinas in 
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essentially ambiguous.16 The French noun ʻambigu(ë)ʼ 
has two main senses, the second of which is less 
evident in the English usage of ʻambiguous ,ʼ but is 
probably the most important here. In both languages 
it refers chiefly to linguistic expression and means the 
possibility of having more than one interpretation, or 
uncertainty in interpretation. In French the word also 
means that in which two opposing qualities are united, 
or that which participates of two different natures. For 
Levinas, the ambiguity of love lies not in the possibil-
ity of more than one interpretation, but in the necessity 
of simultaneous and contradictory ones which are not, 
however, synthesized or united. ʻThe metaphysical 
event of transcendence ,ʼ he says, ʻis not accomplished 
as love. But the transcendence of discourse is bound 
to love. We shall show how in love transcendence 
goes both further and less far than language.ʼ  True, 
love is directed towards the Other, but there is also 
the inevitability that love ʻthrows us back this side of 
immanence itself ;ʼ love is thus an event situated at the 
limit of transcendence and immanence.17
The aspect of immanence is attributed to the fact 
that in love, now characterized as voluptuosity (la 
volupté) and Eros, ʻVoluptuosity … aims not at the 
Other but at his voluptuosity: it is voluptuosity of 
voluptuosity, love of the love of the other.… If to 
love is to love the love the Beloved [lʼAimée] bears 
me, to love is also to love oneself in love, and thus to 
return to oneself.ʼ 18 In love both desire and need, meta-
physical desire and erotic desire, transcendence and 
concupiscence, coexist. Furthermore, the suggestion 
is not that now one, now the other, prevails but that 
both prevail and that this ambiguity and simultaneity 
is the very essence of love, ʻconstitutes the originality 
of the erotic which, in this sense, is the equivocal par 
excellence .ʼ The aspect of transcendence, on the other 
hand, is attributed to the fact that love is a relation 
which also goes beyond the Other to ʻthe infinitely 
future, which is to be engendered ,ʼ19 fulfilling itself in 
fecundity, the sense and implications of which remain 
to be explicated.
This story is also told in another way. The ambi-
guity of love is also the ambiguity of the love object, 
lʼaimé, or rather ʻ[e]piphany of the Beloved, the 
feminine :ʼ lʼAimée. Love, Levinas says, is directed 
at the Other ʻin his frailty.… To love is to fear for 
another, to come to the assistance of his frailty.… 
The epiphany of the Beloved [lʼAimée] is but one 
with her regime of tenderness. The way of the tender 
consists in an extreme fragility, a vulnerability.ʼ  The 
Beloved manifests herself ʻat the limit of being and 
non-being, as a soft warmth where being dissipates 
into radiance…ʼ20 But at the same time, Lʼ aimée, or 
the feminine, is something gross, an ʻexorbitant ultra-
materiality ,ʼ or non-signifying raw being.21 She is 
at once too frail for this world and yet too much (a 
part) of it. She is a mystery, hidden, modesty itself, 
but also openly displayed in ʻthe exhibitionist nudity 
of an exorbitant presence … profaning and wholly 
profaned ,ʼ22 immodesty and indecency par excellence. 
The erotic caress also reveals the ambiguity of love, 
or reveals lʼaimée in her ambiguity. Never catching 
hold of anything, the caress has its correlate in the 
carnality of femininity:
The Beloved, at once graspable but intact in her 
nudity, beyond object and face and thus beyond the 
existent, abides in virginity. The feminine essential-
ly violable and inviolable, the ʻEternal Feminineʼ, 
is the virgin or an incessant recommencement of 
virginity, the very contact of voluptuosity, future 
in the present.… The virgin remains ungraspable, 
dying without murder.… The caress aims at neither 
a person nor a thing. It loses itself in a being that 
dissipates as though into an impersonal dream with-
out will and even without resistance, a passivity, 
an already animal or infantile anonymity, already 
entirely at death.23
These descriptions appear in section IV of Totality 
and Infinity, ʻBeyond the Face ,ʼ and it is not always 
easy to grasp where the erotic relation is situated 
vis-à-vis ethics or religiosity. But beyond the face is 
effectively, in Eros, a movement beyond lʼaimée, one 
in which the face of the beloved gets lost or shadows 
over: ʻIn the feminine face the purity of expression is 
already troubled by the equivocation of the voluptu-
ous. Expression is inverted into indecency, already 
close to the equivocal which says less than nothing, 
already laughter and raillery.ʼ  Elsewhere, the feminine 
is described as effecting an ʻinversion of the face ,ʼ 
a ʻdisfigurement .ʼ24 Because the feminine does not 
signify as face, the relation of the lover towards her 
is then not, apparently, one towards an adult human 
being at all. This is made particularly clear in the 
following extraordinary passage:
The beloved is opposed to me not as a will strug-
gling with my own or subject to my own, but on 
the contrary as an irresponsible animality which 
does not speak true words. The beloved, returned 
to the stage of infancy without responsibility – this 
coquettish head, this youth, this pure life ʻa bit silly  ʼ
– has quit her status as a person. The face fades, 
and in its impersonal and inexpressive neutrality is 
prolonged, in ambiguity, into animality. The re-
lations with the Other are enacted in play; one plays 
with the Other as with a young animal.25
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Now for some, it is clearly tempting to dismiss these 
particularly unpalatable passages as philosophically 
unimportant, an embarrassing intrusion, say, of Levi-
nas sʼ sexual fantasies into an otherwise respectable 
philosophical text. Yet this is precisely a phenomen-
ology of Eros, a philosophical elaboration of what 
Levinas takes to be the everyday experience of a 
heterosexual erotic encounter. The phenomenology of 
Eros is nothing without its details, and the role and 
character of ʻthe feminineʼ are surely amongst the 
most important of these. Furthermore, the role of 
Eros, the character of the feminine and the theme of 
sexual difference more generally are not secondary 
aspects in Levinas sʼ philosophical schema. The erotic 
relation was first introduced as the originary relation 
with the Other in which the subject remains intact 
whilst also being afforded an experience of trans-
cendence. As such, the erotic relation is the answer 
to the leading question not only of Existence and 
Existents and Time and the Other, but of Totality 
and Infinity too. Sexual difference is also explicitly 
signalled as the originary difference that ʻconditions 
the very possibility of reality as multiple ;ʼ26 in so far 
as Levinas sʼ project is pitted against a supposedly 
Parmenidean ontology of totality, sexual difference is 
the difference that makes ethical resistance possible. 
Even if in Totality and Infinity the interruption of 
the totality or ʻonenessʼ of Being is ultimately tied to 
the analyses of fecundity and paternity – elaborated 
according to a masculine metaphoric – these latter 
are crucially dependent on the phenomenology of 
Eros and the role of the feminine that appear in close 
textual and conceptual proximity.
The phenomenology of Eros and the role and char-
acter of the feminine are, then, amongst the most 
philosophically important aspects of Levinas sʼ work 
up to and including Totality and Infinity. Accordingly, 
it ought not to be ignored that here Levinas endorses 
some very reactionary themes indeed, in particular the 
familiar characterization of woman as virgin/woman 
as sexual object or whore; in Levinas sʼ words, woman 
as inviolate, woman as violated.27 In a sense, as a 
purely descriptive psychology or sociology there may 
be some truth in this dichotomy; it is, after all, con-
sonant with the representation of women behind the 
two ʻcurrentsʼ (affectionate and sensual) described 
in Freud sʼ 1912 essay ʻOn the Universal Tendency 
to Debasement in the Sphere of Love .ʼ28 Still, the 
question of the consequences of this wholly uncritical 
reproduction of certain ideological assumptions needs 
to be investigated.
De Beauvoir and the masculine 
standpoint
Possibly the first and certainly the most famous femi-
nist criticism of Levinas appears as a footnote to the 
Introduction of Simone de Beauvoir sʼ 1949 text The 
Second Sex.29 Early on, the frank assertion that ʻHe 
is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the otherʼ30 
is justified and illustrated with reference to Levinas, 
quoting those passages from Time and the Other in 
which the prototypical alterity of the feminine is 
affirmed.31 Now at first sight this would seem to be 
a criticism easily dismissed by pointing out that de 
Beauvoir has made a gross error of interpretation 
in failing to see that what Levinas means by the 
term ʻOtherʼ is not at all what de Beauvoir or Sartre 
mean by it. But the resonances of her quarrel do not 
end here, and these seemingly naive complaints in 
fact touch at the very heart of the most convincing 
and devastating feminist critique that it is possible 
to make of Levinas. De Beauvoir sʼ criticism is in 
fact twofold. First, she takes issue with Levinas for 
writing from an explicitly masculine standpoint, 
ʻdeliberately taking a man sʼ point of view ,ʼ such that 
his description, which is intended to be objective, is in 
fact an assertion of masculine privilege. Second, and 
which she also takes to be ʻan assertion of masculine 
privilege ,ʼ she thinks that the role into which he has 
cast ʻthe feminineʼ denies ʻwomanʼ a full subjectivity. 
A slightly later passage from Time and the Other, also 
quoted in The Second Sex, is de Beauvoir sʼ evidence 
for this second argument: ʻThe existent is accom-
plished in the “subjective” and in “consciousness”; 
alterity is accomplished in the feminine. This term 
is on the same level as, but in meaning opposed to, 
consciousness.ʼ 32
What de Beauvoir means by Levinas sʼ ʻmascu-
line standpointʼ is perhaps not immediately clear. 
For some critics – and this would include Levinas sʼ 
advocates on this point – de Beauvoir was mistaken in 
assuming that Levinas could have done anything other 
than ʻspeak from a masculine standpoint ,ʼ or ʻtake a 
man sʼ point of view .ʼ For has not the phantasmic ideal 
of a pure stance of objectivity, uncontaminated by 
history, personality or prejudice, itself been revealed 
as perhaps the greatest of the prejudices of the phil-
osophers? Yet while history, context and tradition, to 
name but a few, are readily avowed as essential to 
any understanding of any given philosophy, it is not 
therefore the case that philosophical discourse today 
is willing and eager to consider the gender of a text sʼ 
author as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for 
understanding – that is, when that author is not a 
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woman. That much philosophy has been written from 
ʻa masculine standpointʼ has been covered over by the 
tendency of the masculine to represent the absolute 
human type from which the feminine is thought to 
be a deviation or upon which she is parasitic. Of 
course, de Beauvoir herself was not slow in recogniz-
ing this:
A man never begins by presenting himself as an 
individual of a certain sex; it goes without saying 
that he is a man. The terms masculine and feminine 
are used symmetrically only as a matter of form, as 
on legal papers. In actuality the relation of the two 
sexes is not quite like that of two electrical poles, 
for man represents both the positive and the neutral 
… it is understood that the fact of being a man is 
no peculiarity.33
Masculinity is allowed to remain largely unmarked 
precisely because ʻheʼ represents an alleged neutrality 
or universality. A woman philosopher, on the other 
hand, is a different thing (as is a feminist one). Thus 
François Mauriac, on reading The Second Sex, was 
apparently able to remark to an author from Les 
Temps Modernes, ʻI have learned all about your boss sʼ 
vagina ,ʼ34 while Sartre sʼ misogyny and/or gynophobia 
in Being and Nothingness presumably did not warrant 
remark. Sartre sʼ ʻmasculine point of 
viewʼ is rarely mentioned (not even 
by de Beauvoir) as it is presumed to 
be everyone sʼ point of view, whereas 
de Beauvoir sʼ ʻfeminine point of viewʼ 
is evidence enough of the partiality 
(non-universality) of her text.
These comments, then, point to a 
double fault: both the failure to remark 
on the specificity of the masculine, and 
the failure (shared by de Beauvoir) to 
see specificity as anything other than 
a regrettable failure of objectivity. De 
Beauvoir performs a necessary service 
when she points out the masculine 
specificity of Levinas sʼ text (would 
that she had also turned her critical 
eye on Sartre), but for some she is not 
on strong ground in supposing that it 
could have been otherwise. Indeed, 
contra de Beauvoir, it has been argued 
that the obviousness of this specificity 
in Levinas sʼ work (and not just in 
Time and the Other) marks him out 
as an honourable exception in a dis-
honourable and dishonest tradition. 
Jacques Derrida, for example, in his 
first and most famous essay on Levinas (ʻViolence 
and Metaphysics ,ʼ 1964), asks the reader to note, ʻin 
passing ,ʼ that 
Totality and Infinity pushes the respect for dis-
symmetry so far that it seems to us impossible, 
essentially impossible, that it could have been 
written by a woman. Its philosophical subject is 
man (vir).… Is not this principled impossibility for 
a book to have been written by a woman unique in 
the history of metaphysical writing?35
This and other questions, held in abeyance in ʻVio-
lence and Metaphysics ,ʼ were to be taken up again by 
Derrida in his second essay on Levinas, Aʻt This Very 
Moment in This Work Here I Amʼ (1980).36 For if this 
later piece is much more critical of Levinas vis-à-vis 
ʻthe feminine ,ʼ the comments in the last footnote of 
ʻViolence and Metaphysicsʼ could be read as praise. 
If it was possible that any other book in the history 
of metaphysical writing could have been written by a 
woman, that would be because those books appear to 
be written from the objective, that is ʻneutral ,ʼ stand-
point that de Beauvoir apparently demands. But this 
would be deceptive; the appearance of neutrality would 
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the assumption of a false sexual neutrality. Because 
of the treatment of the feminine as a mystery to him, 
Levinas, however, leaves us in no doubt that these 
books were written by a man, from a masculine stand-
point, which is altogether more honest.
On the other hand, perhaps that is not what Derrida 
meant at all. It is hard to attribute such an unpersua-
sive argument to the author of the sophisticated and 
critical Aʻt This Very Moment .ʼ It would have taken 
a profoundly inattentive reader not to have noticed, 
until 1964, any other single text in the history of meta-
physical writing that bore the stamp of its masculine 
provenance. To persist with a ʻpositiveʼ reading of 
Derrida sʼ last footnote, the best that one could say 
is that Levinas is not concerned to dissimulate the 
position from which he writes, to hide the fact that 
he is writing from ʻa masculine standpoint .ʼ But this 
would be an unreservedly positive move in only two 
scenarios: either if ʻa masculine standpointʼ was in 
itself a good thing, or if it was as well that the reader 
be warned about this ʻmasculine standpointʼ because 
there was something further to say about it.
On balance, then, if it is impossible that either 
Time and the Other or Totality and Infinity could have 
been written by a woman, this is a matter deserving 
fuller investigation rather than congratulation. The 
obviousness of Levinas sʼ masculine specificity in his 
philosophical writing would then indeed make him 
something of an exception (though by no means as 
unique as Derrida suggests), but not necessarily an 
honourable one. Accordingly, de Beauvoir sʼ first criti-
cism of Levinas still remains to be explored. Granted 
that he could not have written as if in a social-sexual 
vacuum, granted that he does write (amongst other 
things) as a man (this man), what is it that he says ʻas 
a manʼ? Are there different ways to write ʻas a manʼ? 
And what is the significance of his ʻwriting as a manʼ 
to his philosophy quite generally?
Sex/sexual difference: a simple  
reversal of terms?
One structural or formalistic response to these ques-
tions would be to ask whether Levinas sʼ ʻmasculine 
standpointʼ and textual heterosexuality are essential or 
simply expedient. Suggestions that a simple reversal 
of terms would suffice to make this philosophy uni-
versally applicable, rather than descriptive of only a 
masculine, heterosexual subjectivity,37 take inspiration 
from the horse sʼ mouth. In the Preface added to the 
1979 edition of Time and the Other, Levinas reflects 
on his own work and emphasizes the importance 
given to the notion of the feminine in this early text. 
In a passage perhaps containing a veiled nod in the 
direction of his feminist critics (perhaps even a nod 
to Simone de Beauvoir?), Levinas says of Time and 
the Other:
The notion of a transcendent alterity – one which 
would open time – is first of all sought starting with 
an alterity-content, starting with femininity. Femi-
ninity – and one would have to see in what sense 
this can be said of masculinity or of virility; that is, 
of the differences between the sexes in general – ap-
peared to me as a difference contrasting strongly 
with other differences, not merely as a quality, 
different from all others, but as the very quality of 
difference.38
Here Levinas himself suggests that the possibility of 
a reversal of terms would universalize his phenom-
enology of Eros. But even overlooking the surely not 
minor detail that this would be to ascribe to the rela-
tion with the Other a symmetry and a reciprocity that 
Levinas again and again denied, the strategy of reversal 
simply will not work. In the first place it will not work 
because of the very specific role and character of ʻthe 
feminineʼ within the bounds of Levinas sʼ philosophy. 
The textual proximity of the notions of ʻEros ,ʼ ʻsexual 
differenceʼ and the ʻfeminineʼ itself suggests that they 
are intimately, even essentially, connected, particularly 
in Totality and Infinity where the discussion of the 
ambiguity of love slides ineluctably into a discussion 
of the feminine as the epiphany of the equivocal. 
Similarly, the discussion of Eros in Time and the 
Other glides from alterity to the feminine to sexual 
difference and back to the feminine with no change of 
register. The whole account of the phenomenology of 
Eros in Totality and Infinity depends on the descrip-
tion of the ambiguity of love, and this ambiguity is 
crucially manifested in the ambiguity/equivocality of 
the feminine said to be the epiphany of the beloved. 
The particular details of the account of the feminine 
cannot be excised, whether through embarrassment or 
dishonesty, as they are indispensable to the argument. 
Unless everything pertaining to the description of the 
feminine (ʻessentially violable and inviolableʼ) could 
be transferred to a description of the masculine from 
a (heterosexual) ʻfeminine point of view ,ʼ there would 
be no account of Eros left. But the feminine is not a 
separable element that can be taken out and replaced 
by something else. What is ascribed to the feminine, 
both its role and its attributes, is ascribed precisely 
to the feminine, and it would clearly be artificial and 
awkward to replace all references to the feminine with, 
say, the masculine (ʻThe masculine essentially violable 
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and inviolable, the “Eternal Masculine” is the virgin 
or an incessant recommencement of virginity…ʼ). 
Alterity is attached to the feminine as an essential 
attribute, and as such (in her alterity) she is given 
an ontological status. In ʻJudaism and the Feminine 
Elementʼ (1960) a similarly uncompromising language 
is used: ʻWoman is complete immodesty, down to the 
nakedness of her little finger. She is the one who, par 
excellence, displays herself, the essentially turbulent, 
the essentially impure. Satan, says an extremist text, 
was created with her.ʼ 39
The effect of this and other texts is also the figuring 
of the feminine or of woman as sexual difference.40 
But like the various other characteristics assigned 
to the feminine, ʻessentially violable and inviolable ,ʼ 
this is not Levinas sʼ innovation. The notion of ʻthe 
feminineʼ with its attendant qualities is already avai-
lable for Levinas and his phenomenology of Eros. 
The association of the feminine with sexual difference 
is one already in circulation, and one which makes 
the argument of Time and the Other possible. This 
coils back to a point that has been made before. If 
ʻthe feminineʼ is here marked as sexual difference, 
ʻthe masculineʼ must be sexually unmarked – that is, 
neuter; ʻmanʼ can lay claim to the universal represen-
tation of the human, while ʻwomanʼ is marked as a 
particularity. Thus it is not only ʻthe feminineʼ which 
carries with it the weight of accumulated associations, 
but ʻthe masculineʼ as well, and when it is said that, 
bravo, Levinas ʻwrites like a man ,ʼ this does not neces-
sarily mean, as Derrida suggests it could, that ʻ[h]is 
signature thus assumes the sexual mark, a remarkable 
phenomenon in the history of philosophical writing, 
if the latter has always been interested in occupying 
that position without re-marking upon it or assuming 
it on, without signing its mark.ʼ 41 In writing like a man 
in Time and the Other Levinas takes his cue from 
the history of philosophical writing and, in sliding 
together the feminine and sexual difference, in fact 
assumes the position of the unmarked, allegedly neuter 
ʻman ,ʼ in which there is no peculiarity. Man or the 
masculine, which bears the burden of the association 
with the universal, could never play the role of the 
sexual Other in a Levinasian account of Eros precisely 
because for Levinas man or the masculine is sexually 
unmarked.
The second part of de Beauvoir sʼ complaint, that 
Levinas denies ʻwomanʼ a position of subjectivity, is 
also pertinent to his phenomenological description 
of the self and its being in the world before the 
irruption of the Other in the ethical relation. In the 
discussion of the dwelling in Section II of Totality and 
Infinity Levinas describes a self happy to exist in a 
dependent relation with the world because of its own 
needs, but also compelled to provide for an uncertain 
future through its labour, through the gathering of 
possessions. At the same time, this engages the self in 
relations with the world that afford it the opportunity 
to rise from the condition of the beasts.42 In order to 
labour, however, the self ʻmust be able to recollect 
itself [se receuillir] and have representationsʼ and ʻrec-
ollection and representation are produced concretely as 
habitation in a dwelling [une demeure] or a Home ,ʼ43 
which is a dwelling or a home precisely because it is 
the site of the welcome of the Other. In allowing for 
what Levinas calls the ʻseparationʼ of the self,44 the 
dwelling and the welcome of the Other are what make 
the constitution of the self as a self-reflecting human 
being possible.
Now this appears to be something of a contradiction, 
because elsewhere in Totality and Infinity the presence 
of the Other is, on the contrary, that which disrupts the 
self-reflecting self with the demand constitutive of the 
ethical relation. The apparent contradiction is resolved, 
however, with the description of a welcoming Other 
whose presence is qualified with a certain absence, 
whose face is discreetly hidden:
And the other whose presence is discreetly an 
absence is the Woman. The woman is the condition 
for recollection, the interiority of the Home, and 
inhabitation. The Other who welcomes in intimacy 
is not the you [vous] of the face that reveals itself 
in a dimension of height, but precisely the thou 
[tu] of familiarity: a language without teaching, a 
silent language, an understanding without words.… 
[T]he discretion of this presence includes all the 
possibilities of the transcendent relationship with the 
Other. It is comprehensible and exercises its func-
tion of interiorization only on the ground of a full 
human personality, which, however, in the woman, 
can be reserved so as to open up the dimension of 
interiority.45
The woman (la Femme, also therefore the wife) is thus 
peculiarly able to forgo her full human subjectivity in 
order to function as the condition for man, presumably, 
to accede to his – and de Beauvoir sʼ twofold critique 
rings in the ears.
In an attempted defence of Levinas on this point, 
some commentators have focused on the first half of 
his assertion that the feminine ʻis comprehensible and 
exercises its function of interiorization only on the 
ground of a full human personality, which, however, in 
the woman, can be reserved so as to open the dimen-
sion of interiority.ʼ 46 Edith Wyschogrod, for example, 
tries to insist on a reading in which the feminine would 
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appear as both feminine and human being, but in fact 
points to what makes this reading fail:
Levinasʼs intention, in my view, is not to divide 
humanity so that one sex retains human status while 
the other fades into the infra-human which is neither 
expression nor reason. His effort is directed not to 
reducing the human status of woman, but to separat-
ing the feminine element from the pure humanity of 
women in order to bring to light the meaning of the 
erotic. Woman can be ʻinterlocutor  ʼ and teacher; but 
in her feminine role she is disingenuous, elusive, 
seductive and dangerous. The failure is not hers 
but belongs to the infra-ethical status of the erotic 
itself.47
In fact, I agree with Wyschogrod in so far as it 
would be ludicrous to ascribe to Levinas, the man, 
the view that he does not believe women to have 
human status. Neither is this what de Beauvoir meant 
to imply in The Second Sex, where she makes a point 
of saying, ʻI suppose that Levinas does not forget 
that woman, too, is aware of her own consciousness 
or ego.ʼ 48 Nevertheless, and perhaps despite himself, 
the implication of Levinas sʼ philosophical writings 
is indeed that the feminine is opposed to the human 
in a way that the masculine is not.49 ʻThe humanʼ in 
Levinas is ostensibly sexually neuter, and is separated 
out from the being of the human in his or her sexuate 
incarnation or from the human being under the mark 
of sexual difference. However, it is the case that it is 
only the feminine being which appears in her sexuate 
incarnation or under the mark of sexual difference. 
As a consequence ʻthe humanʼ and the masculine are 
conjoined in such a way that the former actually loses 
all claim to neutrality; it is the mask of the masculine. 
I think Wyschogrod sʼ remarks actually underscore 
rather than refute this.50 The attempted defence of 
Levinas on this point, the idea that the feminine only 
performs her function on the basis of a full human 
personality (a face, in Levinas sʼ sense), is repeatedly 
gainsaid in the Levinasian texts themselves. In her 
capacity as feminine, signifier of sexual difference, 
woman is opposed, in some sense, to the human, in 
a way that man, qua masculine, is not. Once again, 
the impossibility of any reversal of terms is tied to 
details of the text itself, and while this may be an 
effect – contingent and historical – of his ʻspeaking 
as a man ,ʼ it is by no means a necessary consequence 
of it.
Engendering fecundity
Despite the shift to a masculine metaphoric, these 
conclusions are affirmed in the themes of fecundity 
and paternity. In Time and the Other it becomes clear 
that the true solution to the problem of transcendence 
does not lie with the feminine at all: ʻI am going to 
return to the consideration that led me from death to 
the alterity of the feminine.… How, in the alterity 
of a you, can I remain I, without being absorbed or 
losing myself in that you? … This can only happen 
in one way: through paternity.ʼ 51 This is confirmed in 
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in the ambiguous erotic relation with the feminine 
because of its compromising aspect of immanence, 
but Eros functions as the way to fecundity in which 
transcendence is achieved.
The idea of transcendence is connected to the need 
to abandon a certain thinking of Being which Levinas 
calls ʻParmenidean .ʼ52 According to the logic of this 
thinking, Levinas says, ʻwe always imagine existing 
in an existent, one existent. Being qua being is for us 
monadic. Pluralism appears in Western philosophy 
only as a plurality of subjects that exist. Never has it 
appeared in the existing of these existents.… Unity 
alone is ontologically privileged.ʼ 53 In other words, 
unity and multiplicity are always thought as logically 
incompatible, hence the opposition dramatized in anti-
quity as the feud between the schools of Parmenides 
and Heraclitus. The radicality of fecundity, or the 
relation of paternity – for Levinas quite explicitly the 
engendering of a son54 – lies not in an overcoming of 
this opposition, nor in a simple refusal of it. Rather, 
paternity introduces a plurality into being that cuts 
across this opposition: fecundity ʻevinces a unity that 
is not opposed to multiplicity, but, in the precise sense 
of the term engenders it .ʼ55 The son is other than the 
father and yet he is the father, or is of the father. In 
the son the father both remains himself and becomes 
other than himself: ʻI do not have my child, I am in 
some way my child.ʼ 56
In the text of Totality and Infinity it is not always 
easy to distinguish between fecundity and Eros. The 
trajectory of the analyses makes it clear, however, 
that Eros without issue is fatally infected with the 
threat of immanence which is only overcome in a 
fecund resolution,57 when the father has a son. This 
limitation is one side – the negative side – of the 
ambiguity of love. The positive aspect of Eros, its 
relation to transcendence, is precisely its relation to 
fecundity. Even in Existence and Existents and Time 
and the Other, where the possibility of transcendence 
in the erotic relation is spoken of most warmly, as 
it were, Levinas always has an eye on the future 
of Eros in fecundity. As one consequence of this, 
Levinas sʼ Eros is a rather tame animal. Eros as pure 
gratuitous expenditure, exhaustion, that which does not 
produce (engender) but rather uses up, is never really 
considered. Even that which is most carnal in erotic 
nudity – voluptuosity, the caress – always transcends 
the flesh and ends not in physical gratification but in a 
future possibility for ethics. This is a curiously ʻmoralʼ 
and law-abiding Eros, which would in part explain its 
trenchant heterosexuality. Tina Chanter rightly speaks 
of the eclipse of Eros in Levinas sʼ last major work 
(Otherwise Than Being, 1974),58 but in a sense Eros 
– mucky, perverse, unruly, amoral Eros as an end in 
itself – was already banished from Time and the Other 
to make way for the teleology of reproduction inherent 
in its better-behaved cousin.59
In later years, love (amour) is dissociated from 
Eros, and remarks on the latter become more and 
more negative. Eros comes to mean sexual or romantic 
love, while the word ʻloveʼ itself begins to take on 
a whole new role. ʻLoveʼ becomes a new way of 
describing the ethical relation, or religion, to which 
ʻErosʼ is progressively contrasted, almost to the point 
of opposition.60 Even if this linguistic distinction is 
not made in the earlier texts – and it is certainly not 
consistent even in the very latest61 – the effect that it 
later describes is already visible. In 1953, for example, 
in an essay entitled ʻFreedom and Command ,ʼ62 two 
crucial aspects of ʻloveʼ are emphasized: first that the 
duality of the lover and the beloved is a closed couple, 
admitting no third party; and second that love obeys its 
own laws, not those universal or logical laws that for 
Levinas make up the realm of political sociality. This 
is echoed in ʻThe Ego and the Totality ,ʼ63 published 
in 1954, where it is said that in love all my relation 
is exhausted in the beloved; nothing is ʻleft overʼ for 
anyone else.
The worst that can be said of the lovers of these 
early texts, however, is that they are asocial or amoral, 
creatures lost in voluptuosity and carnality – lost in 
themselves – precisely because they are lost in love. By 
1974, on the other hand, there is a suggestion of Eros 
as almost evil. Ethics, now more commonly called 
ʻresponsibility ,ʼ is explicitly aligned with ʻnon-erotic 
proximity :ʼ ʻIt is outside of concupiscence, which for 
its part does not cease to seduce by the appearance of 
the Good. In a Luciferian way it takes on this appear-
ance and thus claims to belong to the Good, gives 
iself out to be its equal, but in this very pretention 
which is an admission it remains subordinated.ʼ 64 No 
doubt the reference to Lucifer is hyperbolic, but one 
takes the point whilst being reminded of another such 
comment, on woman, in ʻJudaism and the Feminine 
Element :ʼ ʻSatan, says an extremist text, was created 
with her.ʼ 65 Despite these diabolic references, however, 
Levinas sʼ main point is, once again, not that Eros is 
bad in itself, but that it is, contrary to ʻthe simplicity 
of contemporary pan-eroticism ,ʼ66 not primary. Such 
remarks are consistent with the trajectory of Levinas sʼ 
entire oeuvre, in which Eros, associated with the 
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feminine, is subordinated to the various terms, either 
overtly masculine or masculine by association, which 
characterize ethics, the most-high, the humanity of 
the human.
It is possible to build a structural picture of the place 
and the role of the feminine and Eros in Levinas sʼ work 
because, despite changes of emphasis and vocabulary, 
the configuration of these themes is remarkably con-
sistent over many years of writing. In Levinas sʼ later 
work, the subordination of Eros or sexual difference 
(marked as feminine) to the human or ethical relation 
becomes plain, but from the very first introduction 
of these themes in Existence and Existents there is 
a progressive subordination of Eros to fecundity in 
which the former, tainted with immanence, functions 
only as a conduit to the transcendence of the latter. As 
Eros is associated with the feminine it is no surprise to 
find that fecundity is elaborated in explicitly masculine 
terms. Furthermore, as the feminine bears the ideologi-
cal mark of sexual difference, it is no surprise to find 
the masculine account of fecundity associated with the 
supposedly sexually neutral ethical space of fraternity, 
and social space of the nation.67 Perhaps the only thing 
that is surprising is the failure of most commentators 
to acknowledge this. Perhaps, on the other hand, that 
is the least surprising thing, for what would it mean 
to acknowledge this? If the supposedly gender-neutral 
relation of ethics as described by Levinas is, in some 
sense, masculine, and has only been possible, structur-
ally, because of a philosophical subordination of the 
feminine; if these words – ʻmasculineʼ and ʻfeminineʼ 
– are not discrete and interchangeable linguistic ele-
ments but ideological signs with a history and which 
exert an influence; if these things are true, what must 
one say about Levinas sʼ philosophy? If it is significant 
that Levinas ʻwrites as a man ,ʼ this fact can now appear 
divested of any essentialism; that is, can now appear 
as an ideological question connected very intimately 
with Levinas sʼ philosophical project, rather than with 
his sex. What is important is not that it is written ʻas 
a man ,ʼ but what it is that this man writes, although 
defenders of Levinas have tended to wash over the 
latter by diverting attention to the obvious textual 
fact of the former.68 Regrettably, and of more general 
significance, the same must also be said of those 
ʻLevinasianʼ feminisms which laud the position of 
alterity that Levinas affords ʻthe feminineʼ in relation 
to his own position. English-speaking readers need to 
understand that the metaphysics of the ʻmasculineʼ and 
the ʻfeminineʼ – the assumption of the fixity of sexual 
difference and its determining role – is perhaps a move 
more easily made in French where le féminin, for 
example, is both feminine and female. Nevertheless, 
such a metaphysics ought not to go unchallenged or 
uninvestigated, and its role in Levinas sʼ phenomenol-
ogy of Eros might serve as a salutary warning.
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